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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF UNWED 
FATHERS IN GEORGIA: 
IN RE BABY GIRL EASON 
INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1972 an unwed father's rights were virtually 
nonexistent. In Stanley v. fllinois1 the United States Supreme 
Court first established that a man who has "sired and raised" 
his children and participated in their "companionship, care, 
custody, and management" had a constitutionally protected private 
liberty interest in his children.2 Since 1972, the Supreme Court 
has refined the parameters of the constitutional rights afforded 
unwed fathers.3 The scope and interpretation of these rights have 
been limited dramatically by the Court since Stanley, rendering 
uncertain both the nature of an unwed father's constitutional 
rights and the manner in which he may obtain such rights.4 The 
Court appears to have delegated to individual state courts the 
task of developing and focusing a putative father's rights.5 
In Georgia, an elaborate system of notice and hearing 
opportunities for the putative father has been mandated since 
the 1977 revision of the Adoption Code.6 In the ensuing years, 
1. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
2. Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. at 651. In Stanley, the Court explained that this 
interest is based on the historical and essential protection granted the familial relationship, 
noting that this protection has been extended even to family relationships not legitimized 
by a marriage ceremony. ld. at 651-2 (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)). 
3. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (19831; Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(19791; Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
4. See, e.g., Note, Lehr v. Robertson: Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: The Supreme 
Court Limits the Scope of the Putative Father's Right to Notice, Hearing, and C01ZSent in 
the Adoption of His Illegitimate Child, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 1501 (1984) (analysis of the 
development of putative fathers' rights in Ohio with particular emphasis on the impact 
of the Lehr decision!; Note, The Putative Father's Due Process Rights to Notice and a 
Hearing: In re Baby Boy Doe, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1081 (1986) (rights of unwed fathers 
in Utah in wake of recent state court case) [hereinafter Note, Due Process Rights]. 
5. A putative father is the "alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 648 (5th ed. 1983). This term will be used interchangeably with 
"unwed father" or "natural father" throughout this Comment to indicate the father of a 
child born out of wedlock. 
6. O.C.G.A. S 19-8·7 (1982). Prior to this revision, notice was not a requirement. See 
1977 Ga. Laws 201. 
591 
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Georgia courts have struggled to define an unwed father's rights, 
holding that the putative father is a recognized parent with 
"some parental rights"7 though only the mother of an illegitimate 
child has a right to custody under Georgia's legitimation statute.s 
Nevertheless, the courts have held that a father who has not 
legitimated his child has no right or standing to sue for custody 
unless the child has been deprived9 or the mother's rights 
terminated.lO In determining the father's rights, the courts 
consistently have applied the "best interests of the child" test in 
deciding whether a child should be legitimized or adopted. l1 As 
a rule, courts have found the child's interests best served by 
adoption rather than by granting a veto right or custody to the 
putative father.12 
7. Nelson v. Taylor, 244 Ga. 657, 658,261 S.E.2d 579, 580 (1979). The court recognized 
parental rights "as well as duties." Id. Interestingly, even when denying an unwed father 
his right to legitimate his child or to veto the child's adoption, the courts have consistently 
expected the father to fulfill his statutory obligations of support. See, e.g., In re Ashmore, 
163 Ga. App. 194, 196, 293 S.E.2d 457, 459 (1982) (legitimation does not affect illegitimate 
child's statutory right to parental support). 
8. O.C.G.A. S 19-7-25 (1982). The Code section provides in part that "unless the father 
legitimates [the child], the mother may exercise all parental power over the child." Id. 
A child may be legitimated under O.C.G.A. S 19-7-22 if the father files a petition, notice 
of which is provided to the child's mother. The court may then declare the child legitimate 
and capable of inheriting from the father. If the father legitimates the child he may then 
veto adoption of the child by strangers. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(e) (1982). The court has used 
the "best interests of the child" standard to determine whether to grant the legitimation 
petition. Of course, the father can always legitimate the child by marrying the mother. 
O.C.G.A. S 19-7-20(c) (1982). 
This Comment addresses the rights of fathers who have not sought legitimation. 
Consequently, these fathers are not "recognized" under Georgia law. 
9. To determine whether parental rights should be terminated, the courts look at a 
variety of factors including whether the child is deprived as defined by O.C.G.A. S 15-
11-2(8) (Supp. 1988). 
10. Williams v. Davenport, 159 Ga. App. 531, 532, 284 S.E.2d 45, 46 (19811 (unwed 
father who alleged maternal unfitness won custody in the superior court but judgment 
was reversed on appeal because father had neither standing to sue nor entitlement to 
custody). 
11. The "best interests of the child" test is one in which the court compares the 
parties seeking adjudication regarding the child and determines which party could provide 
the most beneficial situation for the child. See generaUy Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 
249-51 (1977) (considering the trial court's analysis of the relative fitness of the child's 
natural parents in an adoption proceeding opposed by the child's natural father). 
12. See In re J.B.K., 169 Ga. App. 450, 313 S.E.2d 147 (1984) (granting custody to an 
unwed father who refused to support his child could not be considered in the child's best 
interests); In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 293 S.E.2d 457 (1982) (harm which would 
come to child by disrupting stable home with adoptive parents greatly exceeds any 
benefit the child would receive by legitimation). 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/2
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 593 1988-1989
1989] UNWED FATHERS IN GEORGIA 593 
In re Baby Girl EasonI3 changed the evidentiary standard 
applied to certain classes of putative fathers. First, this Comment 
outlines an unwed father's constitutional rights as established by 
the United States Supreme Court. Second, this Comment examines 
the evolution of Georgia statutes and case law regarding 
legitimation, custody, and adoption by focusing primarily on the 
changes resulting from the 1977 revision of the Adoption Code. 
The "opportunity interest" test, recognized by the Eason court 
as the prerequisite for an expansion of the unwed father's rights, 
is identified and analyzed. Finally, the Comment addresses the 
problems inherent in the Eason decision with respect to the 
rights of the putative father and the interests of other parties. 
1. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
A. Stanley v. illinois 
In Stanley, the United States Supreme Court decided for the 
first time that a putative father's parental rights are 
constitutionally protected as due process liberty interests under 
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution.I4 
Peter Stanley was an unwed father whose children were declared 
wards of the state of Illinois when their mother died even though 
he and the children's mother had an eighteen-year relationship 
during which he helped raise his children.I5 
Under Illinois statutory law, an unmarried father did not have 
a right to a fitness hearing or an opportunity to show lack of 
neglect before his children were declared wards of the state 
because he was not considered a "parent."16 The state did not 
have to prove Stanley unfit in fact because unfitness was presumed 
at lawP The United States Supreme Court found this presumption 
constitutionally invalid because it "foreclose[d] the determinative 
issues of competence and care ... [and ran] roughshod over the 
important interests of both parent and child."IS Stanley was 
granted the right to a fitness hearing because all other Illinois 
parents were entitled to such a hearing and to deny the same to 
13. 257 Ga. 292. 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987). 
14. Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
15. ld. at 646. 
16. !d. at 650 (referring to ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37. § 701-14 (Smith-Hurd 1972). 
17. Stal/ky. 405 U.S. at 650. The dissenting opinion disagreed with this interpretation 
of the state opinion. however. ld. at 661 (Burger. C.J .• dissenting). 
18. ld. at 657. 
3
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Stanley because he was unmarried violated his due process and 
equal protection rights.19 Thus, after Stanley an unwed father 
appeared to stand on equal ground with a married father. 
B. Quilloin v. Walcott 
An unmarried father's rights were not recognized as readily 
as Stanley may have intimated. In the second case, Quilloin v. 
Walcott,20 the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia statute which 
effectively denied a putative father the right to veto his child's 
adoption.21 Leon Quilloin fathered a child but never married or 
lived with the child's mother. The mother married another man 
when the child was three years old, and eight years later she 
consented to the child's adoption by her husband. Quilloin did 
not desire custody but only wanted to block the adoption of the 
child by the mother's husband.22 In Quilloin, the Court stressed 
that an unwed father's interests were "readily distinguishable 
from those of a separated or divorced father" and held that it 
was not unconstitutional to require only the mother's consent to 
adoption under certain circumstances.23 Because Quilloin had never 
assumed any responsibility for his child and the state had a valid 
interest in preserving the family unit already in existence, he 
was denied the right to veto the adoption.24 In Quilloin, the Court 
began to limit the scope of an unwed father's rights in relation 
to the amount of responsibility he was willing to assume. 
C. Caban v. Mohammed 
In the third case of the quartet, Caban v. Mohammed,25 the 
Court found that aNew York statute violated the equal protection 
clause because it treated unwed fathers and unwed mothers 
19. [d. at 658. 
20. 434 U.S. 246 (1977). 
21. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. at 246. The Georgia statute provided that only the 
consent of the mother of an illegitimate child was required for adoption. GA. CODE ANN. 
S 74-403(3) (Harrison 1973). 
22. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 246. 
23. [d. at 256. These circumstances include situations in which the unwed father "has 
never exercised actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never shouldered 
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, 
or care of the child." [d. 
24. The Georgia court applied the "best interests of the child" standard and the 
United States Supreme Court found this to be the correct application of the law. [d. at 
255. 
25. 441 U.S. 320 (1978). 
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dissimilarly.26 The statute governing the adoption of an illegitimate 
child required the consent of the mother but not of the father.27 
Abdiel Caban, like Quilloin, sought to veto the adoption of his 
children by their mother's husband.28 The state court, interpreting 
legislative intent, reasoned that adoptions would be jeopardized 
in general if an unwed father was allowed to intervene and 
withhold consent, and therefore the court did not allow Caban to 
veto the adoption.29 The United States Supreme Court disagreed 
because such reasoning was based on a statute which allowed 
impermissible sex-based distinctions violative of the fourteenth 
amendment.30 The Court emphasized that a putative father was 
able to have a relationship with his child "fully comparable" to 
that of the mother.31 A significant difference between this case 
and Quilloin was that Caban had a firmly established relationship 
with his children, having lived with and supported them for five 
years prior to their mother's marriage to another man.32 Caban's 
position was similar to the father's in Stanley, which may account 
for the similar results. The rationale for the Court's holding may 
be found in Caban's willingness to assume a degree of 
responsibility toward his children that the Court found acceptable. 
D. Lehr v. Robertson 
Lehr v. Robertson33 is the most recent Supreme Court case to 
address the issue of an unwed father's rights. Lehr expands the 
theory that a putative father, although having the potential to 
obtain constitutionally protected rights to his child, must 
affirmatively act in order to realize that potentia1.34 In Lehr, the 
mother of an illegitimate child married and gave consent for her 
husband to adopt the child. In order to halt the adoption, Jonathan 
26. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 385. 
27. ld. at 385 (construing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW S 111 (McKinney 1977)). The statute 
provided in part that "consent to adoption shall be required •.. [ojf the parents or 
surviving parent, whether adults or infant, of a child born in wedlock [andj [ojf the 
mother, whether adult or infant, of a child born out of wedlock." 
28. ld. at 383. 
29. !d. at 390 (citing In re Malpica·Orsini, 36 N.Y.2d 568, 331 N.E.2d 486 (1975)). 
30. Caban, 441 U.S. at 394. The discrimination in Caban was gender·based unlike that 
in QuiU{Jin, which involved a difference in treatment between unwed fathers and those 
who were married or divorced. 
31. ld. at 389. 
32. ld. at 393. 
33. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
34. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 260-61. 
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Lehr filed a paternity petition seeking to legitimate his child.3s 
Nevertheless, the adoption order was granted and Lehr's motion 
to vacate the order was denied.36 
The United States Supreme Court found that the denial violated 
neither Lehr's due process nor equal protection rights.37 The 
Court stated that "the mere existence of a biological link does 
not merit equivalent constitutional protection."36 Lehr was denied 
the right to notice and a hearing in adoption proceedings for his 
child even though, as the dissent emphasized, he had attempted 
to establish a relationship with his child.39 Because Lehr had not 
filed with the putative father registry set up in New York to 
protect unwed fathers' interests, the majority reasoned that there 
was insufficient indication of true intent to legitimate his child.40 
In light of these cases, it appears that a putative father has 
some constitutional rights protecting his relationship with his 
child. The full scope and context of these rights, and the time 
when they come into existence, have not been delineated 
completely. In Lehr, however, the Court did indicate that the 
rights do not arise simply from siring a child. The putative father 
is responsible for securing and preserving his constitutional rights. 
The procedure undertaken to discharge this responsibility is 
determined primarily by the case and statutory law of the 
individual states. 
II. GEORGIA LAW 
A. The Legal Status of Unwed Fathers Before 1977 
1. Statutory Provisions 
It is probably safe to assume that the 1933 Adoption Code of 
Georgia41 was indicative of the morality of the times. Illegitimate 
35. ld. at 248. Legitimation under state law provides a father the right to veto his 
child's adoption. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(e) (1982) ("If the child is legitimated by the 
putative father, the adoption shall not be permitted."). 
36. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248. 
37. ld. at 265, 267. 
38. ld. at 261. 
39. ld. at 269 (White, J., dissenting). 
40. ld. at 264. Lehr had ample opportunity to file, and by merely mailing in a postcard 
to the registry, he would have been eligible for notice. His act of petitioning for 
legitimation came only after adoption proceedings had begun. The Court apparently found 
this display of interest to be too little, too late. ld. at 248. 
41. GA. CODE ANN. SS 74-201 to -407 {Harrison 1933). 
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children and their parents were not necessarily entitled to the 
same degree of privileges as children and parents in legitimized 
relationships. The mother of an illegitimate child could be brought 
before a justice of the peace to name the father. Once the father 
was identified, a warrant was issued and he was required to 
appear before the justice of the peace and give a bond for the 
maintenance and education of the child until the age of fourteen, 
as well as for the mother's expenses for the child's birth.42 If the 
mother refused to name the father, she was subject to 
imprisonment for up to three months.43 
Although an unwed father had a support obligation, he was 
not a recognized parent and had no right to notice of the adoption 
proceedings or the right to consent to or veto the process. Notice 
of adoption was given only to next of kin, parents or guardians, 
and brothers and sisters.44 Consent of the child's mother or father 
was required for adoption.45 Although this would appear to include 
the child's natural father, a clear stipulation was made that "[t]he 
mother of an illegitimate child shall be entitled to the possession 
of the child, unless the father shall legitimate him as before 
provided. Being the only recognized parent, she may exercise all 
the parental power ."46 The statute currently used in Georgia 
remains virtually unchanged from that used in 1933.47 
Although the 1933 Code required the mother's or father's 
consent to an adoption, in 1941 the adoption laws were revised 
to include a provision making the unwed father's participation in 
adoption proceedings clearly superfluous: "If the child be 
illegitimate, the consent of the mother alone shall suffice."48 
Because the Code then required notice of adoption proceedings 
to be provided only to parties whose written consent was 
required,49 the revision negated any need for the father's consent 
and placed him among those to whom no notice was due. Thus, 
the putative father not only was denied the right to veto the 
adoption of his child, but also was not entitled to notice that 
42. GA. CODE ANN. S 74-303 (Harrison 1933). 
43. GA. CODE ANN. S 74-306 (Harrison 1933). 
44. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (Harrison 19331. 
45. GA. CODE ANN. S 74-402 (Harrison 1933). 
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (Harrison 1933). 
47. See O.C.G.A. S 19-7·25 (1982). This section reads: "Only the mother of an illegitimate 
child is entitled to his custody, unless the father legitimates him as provided in Code 
section 19-7-22. Otherwise, the mother may exercise all parental power over the child." 
48. 1941 Ga. Laws 300, 301, § 3(2). 
49. Id. at 302, S 5. 
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such an adoption was imminent. Under this statutory scheme, 
Georgia courts were not particularly responsive to putative 
fathers' desires to veto the adoptions of their children or to 
legitimate them. 
2. Case Law 
In Keheley v. Koonce,50 an unwed mother sought to stop the 
adoption of her child to which she had previously consented. The 
natural father was not involved in the proceedings but had given 
his consent.51 The adoption was ultimately denied because the 
court determined that the mother's consent was not freely given.52 
The Georgia Supreme Court held that because the mother of an 
illegitimate child was the only recognized parent, only the consent 
of the mother was necessary to authorize an adoption;53 the 
father's consent was irrelevant.54 
Putative fathers who sought custody of their children were 
seldom successful. For instance, the father in Day v. Hatton55 
attempted to use a Tennessee decree declaring him the child's 
father to veto his child's adoption and obtain custody. The Supreme 
Court of Georgia refused to recognize the decree,56 holding that, 
in a contest between an unwed father and a third party who had 
the mother's consent to adopt, the party with legal rights to the 
child would be awarded custody unless that result was against 
the child's interests.57 The court evidently found that the unwed 
father had no such legal rights and declined to consider his plea 
for custody, although he had made the effort to be declared the 
child's legal father. 
50. 85 Ga. App. 893, 70 S.E.2d 422 (1952). 
51. Keheley v. Koonce, 85 Ga. App. at 897-98, 70 S.E.2d at 525. The father had 
married the mother but it was an invalid marriage because he had not obtained a divorce 
from his previous wife. The parents lived together again briefly after the child was born 
at which point the father displayed an interest in getting the child back from the adoptive 
parents. Upon the natural parents' final separation, the father gave his written consent 
to the adoption. ld. 
52. ld. at 894, 70 S.E.2d at 523. The mother gave her written consent at the hospital 
two days after the child's birth while she was still under medication. 
53. ld. at 896, 70 S.E.2d at 524. 
54. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
55. 210 Ga. 749, 83 S.E.2d 6 (1954). 
56. Day v. Hatton, 210 Ga. at 749, 83 S.E.2d at 6. Interestingly, the court held that 
an ex parte decree such as the one in question was a violation of the mother's constitu-
tional rights. 
57. ld. at 749, 83 S.E.2d at 7. 
8
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1989], Art. 2
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol5/iss2/2
HeinOnline -- 5 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 599 1988-1989
1989] UNWED FATHERS IN GEORGIA 599 
In Blakemore v. Blakemore,58 the father of an illegitimate child 
was equally unsuccessful when he brought habeas corpus 
proceedings to determine his child's custody. The father did not 
contend that the mother was unfit but rather that the mother 
had released custody of the child to him by contract.59 Absent 
proof of the father's claim or maternal unfitness, the court found 
that the judge "was not vested with any discretion as to which 
of the parties he should award custody and control of the child 
here involved; but in such circumstances, it was his legal duty 
to award custody and control of such child to her mother."60 The 
Georgia Supreme Court once again reiterated its position that 
the control of an illegitimate child who had not been legitimated 
belonged exclusively to the child's mother. 
The putative father in HaU v. Hall61 sought custody against 
the child's maternal grandmother through habeas corpus 
proceedings brought after the death of the child's mother. 
Although the father had married and based his petition on several 
valid theories,62 the court found he had no standing and dismissed 
the action. The court relied on existing law that the mother was 
the only recognized parent of an illegitimate child, even though 
the mother was no longer alive.63 
An unwed father seeking to legitimate64 his child and thereby 
become a recognized parent with exercisable rights was often 
58. 217 Ga. 174, 121 S.E.2d 642 (1961). 
59. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 217 Ga. at 175, 121 S.E.2d at 643. 
60. Id. at 175, 121 S.E.2d at 643. 
61. 222 Ga. 820, 152 S.E.2d 737 (1966). 
62. Hall v. Hall, 222 Ga. at 821, 152 S.E.2d at 738. The father argued that this process 
was the only means of legitimating the child; that he admitted paternity; that he had an 
interest in the child through consanguinity; and that he had a natural devotion to it and 
the purest of motives. 
63. Id. The court considered the fact that the child was with the grandparents after 
the mother died to be sufficient maternal consent for custody, particularly in light of the 
father's lack of any legal rights to his child. 
64. Legitimation of a child born out of wedlock is governed by O.C.G.A. S 19-7-22 
(Supp. 19881: 
A father of a child born out of wedlock may render the same legitimate by 
petitioning the superior court of the county of his residence, the county of 
residence of the child, or, if a petition for the adoption of the child is pending, 
the county in which the adoption petition is filed for legitimation of the 
child. The petition shall set forth the name, age, and sex of the child, the 
name of the mother, and, if the father desires the name of the child to be 
changed, the new name. If the mother is alive, she shall have notice of the 
petition for legitimation. Upon the presentation and filing of the petition, 
the court may pass an order declaring the child to be legitimate and to be 
9
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equally unsuccessful. The court in Clark v. Buttry65 denied the 
father's legitimation petition and allowed the mother's elderly 
foster parents to adopt the child based upon the mother's written 
consent. Relying on the "best interests of the child" test, the 
Georgia Supreme Court held once again that when the mother 
consented to adoption and the father did not legitimate the child, 
the father had no standing to make objections to the adoption 
because the mother's consent alone was sufficient.66 In an eloquent 
concurrence, Judge Eberhardt, although agreeing that the statutes 
and cases must be followed, found "discord in this facet of the 
law."67 He found it incongruous that a father who wished to 
assume the statutory support obligations imposed on him by 
legitimizing and raising his son was not allowed to do SO.66 The 
concurring opinion noted that the father was married, both he 
and his wife held good jobs, the adoptive parents had no blood 
ties to the child, and at their ages it would be only two years 
before the breadwinner would retire and all three would become 
dependent on Social Security. The judge concluded, "It seems to 
me that there should be some recognition in our law of the 
father's interest beyond the imposition of an obligation to 
support."69 
Best v. Acker70 was another legitimation case heard by the 
Georgia Court of Appeals in which the father's petition was 
denied. The mother objected that the petition was not filed in 
good faith because the father sought legitimation in order to 
capable of inheriting from the father in the same manner as if born in lawful 
wedlock and specifying the name by which he shall be known. 
O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(e) (Supp. 1988) states, "If the child is legitimated by the putative 
father, the adoption shall not be permitted except as provided in Code Sections 19-8-3 
through 19-8-6" (upon surrender of parental rights, if necessary). The implications of these 
two processes-legitimation and adoption-upon each other should be obvious. If a 
putative father legitimates his child he becomes a recognized parent and may veto the 
adoption of his child. Clearly, a putative father seeking to stop his child from being 
adopted has a vested interest in petitioning for and being granted the right to legitimate 
his child. 
65. 121 Ga. App. 492, 174 S.E.2d 356 (1970). 
66. Clark v. Buttry, 121 Ga. App. at 494, 174 S.E.2d at 358. 
67. Id. at 496, 174 S.E.2d at 359 (Eberhardt, J., concurring). 
68. Id. at 496, 174 S.E.2d at 360. The statutory obligations were imposed by GA. CODE 
ANN. S 74-202 (now codified at O.C.G.A. S 19-7-24 (1982)), which requires each parent of 
an illegitimate child to provide for the child's maintenance, protection, and education 
until the age of majority. 
69. Id. at 497, 174 S.E.2d at 360. 
70. 133 Ga. App. 250, 211 S.E.2d 188 (1974). 
10
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obtain custody of the child for his own parents.71 Even though 
the mother had waived her right to custody by consenting to 
adoption of the child, her objections to the legitimation petition 
nonetheless were permitted.72 The court held it "must always 
look to the best interest and welfare of the child where there 
exists no absolute legal right in the applicant to the aid he 
seeks."73 Apparently an unwed father in 1974 had no absolute 
legal right to legitimate his child.74 
In 1976, the court of appeals also determined that an unwed 
father whose location was unknown had no legal right to notice 
other than publication before his parental rights were terminated 
prior to his child's adoption.75 In a consolidation of two cases 
brought by the DeKalb County Department of Family and Children 
Services, In re J.B.,76 neither father could be located, and therefore 
they were served process through publication.77 The Department 
wished to obtain custody in order to place the children for 
adoption, but the trial court refused to terminate the fathers' 
rights absent personal service.78 The Georgia Court of Appeals, 
holding that service by publication was sufficient, stated that the 
fathers had never married the mothers or knew of their 
pregnancies; never exercised parental rights over the children; 
never supported the mothers or children; and never "visited, 
guided, contacted, or even knew of the children's existence."79 
Citing the significant state interest in providing children with a 
stable home without delaying the adoption process indefinitely, 
the court found the best interests of the children were served 
by terminating the putative fathers' rights because those rights 
were secondary to the children's welfare.80 
71. Best v. Acker, 133 Ga. App. at 251, 211 S.E.2d at 188. 
72. !d. at 251, 211 S.E.2d at 189. 
73. !d. at 252, 211 S.E.2d at 189. 
74. Bat see In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 161, 205 S.E.2d 522, 523 (1974) ("father's 
right to legitimate is absolute subject only to the qualification that the natural mother 
may object and if she shows valid reasons why the petition should not be granted, the 
judge may deny it"). 
75. In re J.B., 140 Ga. App. 668, 670, 231 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1976). 
76. 140 Ga. App. 668, 231 S.E.2d 821 (1976). 
77. I,I re J.B., 140 Ga. App. at 669, 231 S.E.2d at 822. 
78. Id. at 670, 231 S.E.2d at 823. 
79. Id. at 669, 231 S.E.2d at 823. The court declined to rely on GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-
3202(b), which provided that a putative father who had not established paternity was not 
entitled to notice because "jurisdiction over such fathers is unnecessary altogether." Id. 
at 674, 231 S.E.2d at 825. 
80. Id. at 673, 231 S.E.2d at 824-25. The court did not want to leave the adoptions 
open to contest should the fathers one day suddenly appear and express a desire to 
legitimate the children. Id. at 673, 231 S.E.2d at 824. 
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Georgia statutory and case law prior to 1977 established that 
unwed fathers of illegitimate children were considered legal 
nonentities. Statutorily, only the mother of an illegitimate child 
could consent to or veto an adoption; putative fathers were 
consistently denied that right. Unless the father legitimated his 
child, he apparently had no standing to litigate any issue 
concerning the disposition of the child. 
B. The Legal Status of Unwed Fathers After 1977 
1. Statutory Provisions 
Following the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley,81 
the Georgia General Assembly completely revised the Adoption 
Code in 1977.82 One purpose of the revision was to "require that 
in certain cases notice be given to the putative father of a child 
to be adopted."83 The new statute established a process to notify 
a putative father under particular circumstances.54 The current 
statute, in substantially the same form as the 1977 revision, 
provides that a putative father whose identity and location are 
known be notified by mail that the mother has surrendered 
custody or consented to adoption.85 If the identity or location of 
the putative father is not known, the court can terminate his 
rights after a hearing if "reasonable effort" has been made to 
identify and locate him and the father has made no effort to 
establish a relationship with the child.~ If no reasonable effort 
to locate the father was made, then the hearing is continued until 
the petitioner, the Department of Human Resources, or the 
licensed adoption agency expends additional efforts to locate him 
and reports the results of those efforts.87 If the court finds that 
the father's conduct created a familial bond with his child, the 
father is then entitled to notice of the surrender, consent, or 
81. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text. 
82. 1977 Ga. Laws 201. 
83.Id. 
84. GA. CODE ANN. S 74-406 (now codified at O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7 (1982)). If the father's 
identity and location are known, he is to be notified by registered or certified mail. If 
not known, then he must have shown some interest in the child to be entitled to notice. 
85. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(a) (1982). 
86. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(b)(1) (1982). Specifically, the statute requires the father to have 
lived with the child, contributed to the child's support, made an attempt to legitimate 
the child, or provided support for the mother during pregnancy. 
87.Id. 
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proceeding to terminate his rights.88 If the conduct was not 
sufficient to establish such a bond, the court may terminate his 
rights.89 The notice advises the father that he will lose all rights 
to his child if he does not file a petition to legitimate and provide 
notice of the filing within thirty days after receiving notification 
of the impending adoption proceedings.90 If the father legitimates 
the child, the adoption will not be granted except as provided 
for legitimate children.91 
2. Case Law 
In 1977, prior to the Code revision, the Georgia Supreme Court 
decided Quilloin;92 this case eventually was affirmed by the 
United States Supreme Court.93 Based on the state's interest in 
protecting and caring for its children, the Georgia court found 
that vesting the responsibility for illegitimate children with 
custodial parents fulfilled public policy objectives because the 
father could always choose to join the family unit.94 The court 
therefore upheld the statutory scheme placing all parental power 
and the sole authority to consent to adoption with the mother.95 
That same year the Georgia Supreme Court decided 
Wojciechowski v. Allen96 and once again upheld the statute 
requiring only the mother's consent to the adoption of an 
illegitimate child. The court did so despite the plaintiffs' argument 
that public policy had changed as reflected in the revision of the 
Adoption Code, which recognized that natural fathers have rights 
in their children.97 The parents of the child were not married at 
the time of the child's birth when the mother signed the consent 
form. Six weeks later she filed a retraction and they were 
88. !d. 
89. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7(b)(2) (1982). 
90. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-7(c) (1982). 
91. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(e) (1982). Adoption provisions are found in O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-3 to 
19·8-6 (1982). 
92. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text. 
93. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
94. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). The court made 
the assumption that if there is no marriage, there is no father to raise the child. 
95. fd. at 233, 232 S.E2d at 248. The court referred to GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (now 
codified at O.C.G.A. S 19-7·25 (1982)) and GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403 (now codified at O.C.G.A. 
S 19·8·3 (1982)). The dissent, however, contends that the majority misinterpreted Stanley, 
which recognized "due process rights of all natural fathers, not merely those who live 
with their families." fd. at 235, 232 S.E.2d at 249 (Undercoffler, J., dissenting). 
96. 238 Ga. 556, 234 S.E.2d 325 (1977). 
97. Wojciechowski v. Allen, 238 Ga. at 557, 234 S.E.2d at 326. 
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subsequently married.98 Nevertheless, the court upheld the 
adoption because the revision of the Adoption Code was not 
scheduled to take effect until the following January.99 However, 
in Berry v. Samuels/oo which was decided after the revision took 
effect, the Georgia Court of Appeals summarily denied a putative 
father's attempt to object to his child's adoption. The court found 
that because he had never attempted to legitimize the child or 
provide support, he had no standing to object.101 
The following year, in McCary v. Depa,rtment of Human 
Resources,102 an unwed father appealed a juvenile court order 
terminating his parental rights. The child's mother "consented 
to the termination of her parental rights" and offered the child 
for adoption.103 The father did not petition for legitimation but 
appeared in court to protest termination of his rights. The trial 
court nevertheless ordered the Department of Human Resources 
to assume custody.104 The Georgia Court of Appeals vacated and 
remanded the judgment but only because the trial court had 
applied the "best interests of the child" standard with no 
supporting facts to substantiate its findings. lo5 The father's 
contention that the termination was ineffective because he did 
not receive notice in the manner provided by statute was without 
merit because that statutory provision related only to adoption 
of children, not to termination of parental rights, which does not 
require notice.lo6 
98. ld. at 556, 234 S.E.2d at 325. 
99. ld. at 557, 234 S.E.2d at 326. The natural parents raisE'd additional enumerations 
of error: the child was not illegitimate, the mother's consent was invalid, and the trial 
court should have considered the comparative rights of both natural and adoptive parents. 
The court found all these arguments to be without merit and permitted the adoption to 
stand. 
100. 145 Ga. App. 687, 244 S.E.2d 593 (1978). 
101. Berry v. Samuels, 145 Ga. App. at 687, 244 S.E.2d at 593. 
102. 151 Ga. App. 181, 259 S.E.2d 181 (1979). 
103. McCary v. Department of Human Resources, 151 Ga. App. at 181, 259 S.E.2d at 
181. 
104. ld. at 182,259 S.E.2d at 181-82. 
105. ld. at 183, 259 S.E2d at 182. 
106. ld. at 182, 259 S.E2d at 182. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text. 
In a 1986 amendment to Title 15, Chapter 11 of the Code (Juvenile Proceedings, 
Parental Rights) the legislature provided a new section dealing with the termination of 
a putative father's rights. See O.C.G.A. S 15-11-83 (Supp. 1988). 
If the father's location is known, he must be notified of the termination hearing. If he 
cannot be located through reasonable efforts, then his rights can be terminated if he has 
never lived with or supported the child. The court must engagE' in a determination almost 
parallel to that of the putative father notice section of the Adoption Code to decidE' 
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The court showed greater concern for an unwed father's rights 
later that same year when the Georgia Supreme Court recognized 
the validity of an unwed father's interest in his child. In Nelson 
v. Taylor107 the court stated that "a father has some parental 
rights, as well as duties, in regard to his illegitimate child."lo8 
The court stated, "It is clear . . . that the putative father is also 
a parent."109 In reversing the trial court's grant of adoption, the 
court found that the father as well as the mother was statutorily 
responsible for the maintenance, protection, and education of 
their illegitimate child and that the statute required that the 
biological father receive notice of a pending adoption.110 
In 1980, however, the Georgia courts appeared to return to 
the harsher standard previously applied to unwed fathers. In 
Hinkins v. Francis lll a putative father's appeal from an order 
granting adoption of his child was denied.112 The father had filed 
a petition for legitimation within the required thirty days after 
the adoption petition was filed, but it was denied. The Georgia 
Supreme Court held that "[t]herefore the child was not 
legitimated" and the father had "no standing to challenge the 
trial court's order granting the adoption."113 
whether such a father has established a familial bond with his child sufficient to require 
that notice be provided to him. The section reads: 
If the court finds from the evidence that the putative father either lived 
with the child, contributed to the child's support, attempted to legitimate 
the child, or provided support for the mother, including medical care, during 
her pregnancy or during her hospitalization for the birth of the child, then 
the court shall determine from the evidence whether such conduct by the 
putative father was sufficient to establish a familial bond between the 
putative father and the child. 
D.C.G.A. S 15-11-83(d)(5)(A) (Supp. 1988). For a full history and discussion of the bill see 
SeZ,:ctcd 1986 Georgia Legklation, Juvenile Court: Termination oj Parental Rights, 2 GA. 
ST. U.L. REv. 171 (1986). 
107. 244 Ga. 657, 261 S.E.2d 579 (1979). 
lOS. Nelson v. Taylor, 244 Ga. at 658, 261 S.E.2d at 5S0 (construing GA. CODE ANN. SS 
74-202, 74-406 (now codified at D.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-24, 19-8-4 (1982)). See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text. 
The mother had signed a form that released her rights to "relatives," the parents of 
the father, and later tried to withdraw the release as being in incorrect form because a 
putative father was not a recognized parent and therefore his parents could not be 
"relatives." Nelson, 244 Ga. at 65S, 261 S.E.2d at 580. 
109. Nelson, 244 Ga. at 658, 261 S.E.2d at 5S0. 
110.Id. 
111. 154 Ga. App. 716, 270 S.E.2d 33 (1980). 
112. Hinkins v. Francis, 154 Ga. App. at 716, 270 S.E.2d at 33. No reasons were given 
for the denial of the legitimation petition. It often appears that the father's opportunity 
to legitimate is not really a "right" because his petition can so readily be denied. 
113. !d. 
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A putative father again was denied legitimation in Mabry v. 
Tadlock114 when the court, applying the "best interests of the 
child" standard, determined that the father had "failed to 
demonstrate sufficient parental and paternal interest in the 
children."115 Therefore, he had no absolute right to legitimate his 
children for the purpose of obtaining visitation rights.1l6 The 
Mabry decision began a series of cases in which the court focused 
on an unwed father's interactions with his child. 
Again in 1982, the Georgia Supreme Court applied the "best 
interests of the child" standard to deny legitimation by an unwed 
father in In re Ashmore.ll7 The father was informed of the 
mother's consent to adoption and, although he did not formally 
surrender his rights, told the caseworker he would not object.lls 
It was only after he received official notification of the pending 
adoption that he decided to file his petition to legitimate.119 Once 
again, the court's determination to deny legitimation was based, 
in part, on the father's failure to demonstrate sufficient interest 
in the child.120 The court denied the petition despite the father's 
marriage to the mother three months after she had consented to 
the child's adoption and her testimony that she had not wanted 
to sign the release.121 
The Georgia Court of Appeals also relied upon the "best 
interests" standard in 1984 in In re J.B.K.122 to deny a legitimation 
petition. The putative father sought not only to legitimate his 
three-and-a-half year-old son but also to obtain visitation rights. l23 
114. 157 Ga. App. 257, 277 S.E.2d 688 (1981). 
115. Mabry v. Tadlock, 157 Ga. App. at 258, 277 S.E.2d at 688. The father lived with 
the mother for two to three years during which time the children were born. The mother 
left and married another man and, only two months after that marriage, the Cather 
petitioned first for a divorce from the common·law marriage and then for legitimation 
because he wanted to "visit with the children, love them and be loved by them." These 
facts were apparently not sufficient because he had never attempted to marry the mother. 
Id. 
116. Apparently, only a father seeking custody, not merely visitation rights, has an 
absolute right to legitimate. But see In re Pickett, 131 Ga. App. 159, 205 S.E.2d 522 (1974) 
(father's right to legitimate is absolute, qualified only by mother's right to object). 
117. 163 Ga. App. 194,293 S.E.2d 457 (1982). 
118. In re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. at 194, 293 S.E.2d at 458. The mother would not 
marry him and he could not support the child. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 196, 293 S.E.2d at 460. The trial court also inquired into the father's fitness 
and found that he had been expelled from high school, had a history of alcohol abuse, 
and had no particular trade or stable income. Id. 
121. Id. at 197, 293 S.E.2d at 460-61. 
122. 169 Ga. App. 450, 313 S.E.2d 147 (1984). 
123. In re J.B.K., 169 Ga. App. at 450, 313 S.E.2d at 147. 
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The child was conceived as the result of the only sexual encounter 
between the parents. Although the father offered the mother 
money for an abortion, he never supported either her or the child 
and consistently denied paternity. The child had been in the 
mother's continuous custody and her efforts to establish a 
relationship between father and child were repeatedly rebuffed.124 
Mabry, Ashmore, and J.B.K. indicated that the establishment 
of some type of familial relationship between a father and his 
illegitimate child is a determining factor in Georgia cases. A 
putative father has the potential to create a parent-child 
relationship that has been labeled by one commentator as the 
"opportunity interest."125 
Initially, the opportunity interest is based solely on the biological 
connection.126 However, more is required. One commentator 
suggests that the Court in Caban indicated that the rights of an 
unwed father stem not only from his biological connection but 
also from a "willingness to admit his paternity and express some 
tangible interest in the child."127 As another commentator 
elaborated, "the success of the opportunity claim depends on the 
kind of parent-child relationship the unwed father wants to or 
can establish."128 
Thus, the father of an illegitimate child, by virtue of the fact 
that he sired the child, has the opportunity to develop a paternal 
bond with that child which gives rise to a constitutionally protected 
interest in his child. Conversely, a putative father who has never 
exercised his opportunity interest to establish a protected 
relationship with his child, either officially or because of 
124. ld. at 450-51. 313 S.E.2d at 147-48. The father here. as in Mabry. only wanted 
legitimation for the purpose of visitation rights. not custody. ld. This reason appears to 
be insufficient to grant the petition for legitimation: "O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22 ••. deals 
exclusively with legitimation proceedings and contains no language which can be read as 
requiring a trial court to consider a visitation issue when determining the merits of a 
petition to legitimate." ld. at 451. 313 S.E.2d at 148. 
125. Buchanan. The Crmstitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. 
Robertson. 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313. 351-53 (1984) [hereinafter Buchanan~ 
126. ld. This theory is based on Justice Stevens' statement in Lehr v. Robertson: "The 
significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity 
that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring." Lehr v. 
Robertson. 463 U.S. at 262. 
127. Note. Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - New York Statute Requiring Crmsent 
o.(Mother. But Not of Father. As Prerequisite to Adoption of IUegitimate Child Violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment Because It Draws Gender-Based Distinction Which Bears No Suh-
stantial Relation to State Interest in Encouraging Adoption of lllegitimate Children - Caban 
v. Mohammed. 29 EMORY L.J. 833, 854 (1980). 
128. Buchanan. supra note 125, at 352. 
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circumstances beyond his control, has only a potential relationship. 
Therefore, it is not unconstitutional for such a father to receive 
no notice or hearing regarding the disposition of his child.l29 As 
one practitioner explained, there are 
three elements which must be present to activate the latent 
right of the putative father in order to raise it to the level 
of a constitutionally protected parent-child relationship: (1) 
the biological link; (2) the underlying fitness of the putative 
father to parent; and (3) the full commitment to and exercise 
of custodial and parental responsibility by the putative fa-
ther.Iso 
In April 1987, the Georgia Supreme Court decided In re Baby 
Girl Eason and adopted the opportunity interest test as a means 
of determining whether or not an unwed father has constitutionally 
protected rights in his child.l31 
ITI. IN RE BABY GIRL EASON 
A. The Opportunity Interest Test Comes to Georgia 
Certain facts in Eason were undisputed. The unwed father and 
mother met, dated, and maintained a sexual relationship which 
resulted in the conception of baby girl Eason. Upon learning of 
the pregnancy, the parents discussed various options including 
abortion and adoption. Several weeks before the child was due, 
the father moved from Georgia to California for reasons related 
to his employment, and the parents had no further contact.132 
The mother released her custody rights and placed the child for 
adoption with a licensed adoption agency. When a couple petitioned 
for adoption, the father was notified pursuant to the statutory 
provisions.l33 
Certain other facts relating to the degree of interest the father 
displayed in both mother and child were conflicting. The mother 
contended that the father had agreed to the adoption and had 
129. Id. at 359-60. Official ways a putative father can decline to establish a relationship 
include: surrender of his rights in a written consent to adoption, written waiver of notice, 
adjudication that he is not the child's father, or adjudication terminating his interest. Id. 
at 355. 
130. Amicus Curiae Brief of Child Services and Family Counseling Center, Inc. at 8, 
In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987) (No. 44707). 
131. In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. at 296, 358 S.E.2d at 462. 
132. Id. at 292, 358 S.E.2d at 460. 
133. Id. See O.C.G.A. S 19-8·7 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 85-91. 
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discussed selling the baby for $10,000 but never offered her any 
financial support. Subsequently, he departed for California leaving 
no forwarding address or telephone number.134 The father 
countered that he did offer financial assistance, only discussed 
giving up the baby to test her sincerity, and could have been 
reached in California through friends known to the mother.135 It 
was against this factual scenario that the Georgia court discussed 
the rights of unwed fathers. 
In writing the unanimous opinion, Justice Gregory described 
three categories of putative fathers and the degree of their rights 
in their children. An unwed father who has custody and performs 
all duties of a parent has full constitutional rights in his child 
and must be treated equally with other parents; an unwed father 
who has never had custody or sought to establish any relationship 
with his child has no constitutional rights in his child; and an 
unwed father who has not had custody but has nonetheless 
developed a substantial bond with his child also has a protected 
interest.136 Justice Gregory concluded that "there exists a 
continuum of unwed father-child relationships with assigned 
degrees of protection afforded rights to custody."137 
Based on the biological link alone, an unwed father has an 
opportunity interest to develop a relationship with his child. If 
he exercises that opportunity interest, he establishes constitutional 
rights protected by due process of law.l38 However, these rights 
are not absolute and can be abandoned if not "timely pursued,"139 
but the state cannot deny the father a "reasonable" opportunity 
134. Eason. 257 Ga. at 292-93. 358 S.E.2d at 460. 
135. Id. at 293. 358 S.E.2d at 460. 
136. Id. at 294. 358 S.E.2d at 460-61-
137. ld. at 294. 358 S.E.2d at 461. 
138. Id. at 296. 358 S.E.2d at 462. 
139. Id. Timing appears to be an essential element of the opportunity interest. In Lehr. 
the father was denied his rights partly because two years had elapsed in which he had 
not developed a relationship with his child. In Quilloin. the father was likewise denied 
his rights because eleven years had elapsed. In Doe v. Chambers. 188 Ga. App. 879. 374 
S.E.2d 758 (1988). decided after Eason. the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court's grant of legitimation and custody for an unwed father against the potential 
adoptive parents. The father did not learn of his daughter's birth until two months after 
the fact when he then "vigorously pursued his opportunity interest." ld. at 880. 374 
S.E.2d at 760. In holding that the trial court "conducted the proceedings with impeccable 
regard for the standards established in In re Baby Girl Eason." the appellate court 
apparently reasoned that two months time was insufficient for the unwed father to lose 
his opportunity interest. ld. 
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to exercise his interest.14o The adoption of the opportunity interest 
test is a significant clarification for those involved in adjudicating 
the rights of unwed fathers. More importantly, the adoption of 
the test necessitated the creation of a new standard by which to 
judge the unwed father. 
B. The Evidentiary Standard 
Once the putative father is deemed to have an opportunity 
interest in developing a bond with his child, the question then 
arises as to how these rights are to be evaluated. In Eason, the 
Georgia Supreme Court determined whether the father's rights 
should be judged according to the "best interests of the child" 
test as was previously applied in Georgia or whether he was 
entitled to a fitness test as was the unwed mother.141 
In making that determination, the court held that "because 
Georgia law affords an unwed mother a fitness test or veto power 
under the circumstances it must also afford [the father] a fitness 
test or veto power, provided he has not abandoned his opportunity 
interest."142 The court's decision was based on a fit biological 
father's right to prevail over strangers who desire to adopt his 
child if he has pursued his opportunity interest. When such a 
father seeks custody of his child "[h]e is in pursuit of a recognized 
interest which, if obtained, places him in circumstances of a 
custodial unwed father,"143 and therefore his rights prevail over 
those of adoptive parents. Judicial recourse is appropriate because 
the child has been placed with the adoptive parents pursuant to 
state adoption law, signifying state action.144 To deny a father 
the right to develop a relationship with his child by terminating 
his rights prematurely without an inquiry into his degree of 
involvement with the child would be state action resulting in 
impermissible interference with his constitutional due process 
rights.145 
140. Eason. 257 Ga. at 296. 358 S.E.2d at 460. If the state denies the father his 
opportunity to develop his interest by prematurely terminating his rights. it may be 
considered an interference with his constitutional rights. Buchanan. supra note 125. at 
361-62. 
141. Eason. 257 Ga. at 292. 358 S.E.2d at 460. 
142. ld. at 297. 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
143. ld. at 296. 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
144. ld. at 297. 358 S.E.2d at 463. ("[TJhe relationship here between adopting parents 
and child did not take place in the absence of state participation."). 
145. Buchanan. supra note 125. at 361-62. 
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If an unwed father is judged by the best interests of the child 
test, as he has been in the past, the court compares him with a 
two-parent adoptive home already approved by the adoption 
agency as being fit. Arguably, he will always lose. His 
constitutionally protected rights in his child, which he now 
possesses by having exercised his opportunity interest, will be 
denied simply because the adoptive home may be judged better, 
applying subjective standards. Eason demands that a court must 
determine if the father is "a fit person for custody" in his own 
right.I46 "If he is fit, legitimation should be granted. If not, it 
should be denied."147 
However, an opposing argument is that the court should consider 
the benefits to the child in all circumstances. The basis of this 
argument is that the totality of the circumstances should be 
examined rather than merely focusing on the putative father's 
fitness or lack of it: a child's best interests should not "exist in 
a vacuum," dependent only upon a technical determination of 
individual fitness.I48 The court apparently considered, and rejected, 
these arguments.I49 
The Eason court enumerated certain situations in which the 
best interests standard would be appropriate, but those 
circumstances were not present in Eason.I50 Although the adoptive 
parents had developed a relationship with baby Eason, it is 
precisely because this relationship existed as a result of state 
action that the best interests test could not be used.I51 The court 
held: 
Only the state can alter its action to prevent the development 
of a parent-child relationship with adopting parents until the 
unwed father's rights are resolved. Thus we conclude if [the 
father] has not abandoned his opportunity interest, the stan-
dard which must be used to determine his rights to legitimate 
146. Eason, 257 Ga. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
147. ld. 
148. Brief of Appellees, at 110 -11, In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 
(1987) (No. 44709). 
149. Eason, 257 Ga. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
150. A best interests test could be used in a divorce when each party has equal rights 
and a fitness test is not appropriate. The test may also be used when a custodial mother 
and a stepfather seek to adopt the child, because in that situation an unwed father would 
never have an opportunity to become a custodial parent. ld. at 296-97, 358 S.E.2d at 
463. 
151. !d. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
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the child is his fitness as a parent to have custody of the 
child. If he is fit he must prevail.152 
The interests of the unwed father are now on equal footing 
with those of the unwed mother in Georgia. The unwed father 
must be evaluated on his merits alone to determine whether he 
is fit to legitimate and assume custody of his child provided he 
has not abandoned his opportunity interest.l53 If the father is 
determined to be fit, then legitimation will be granted regardless 
of the adoptive parent's equal fitness.154 However, Eason did not 
definitively answer all questions arising from the new standards. 
C. Unanswered Questions 
1. Activation of the Interest 
The Eason standard represents a substantial step forward in 
Georgia's recognition of the rights of an unwed father. There 
are, however, unanswered questions inherent in the decision. 
Because the father's rights do not become activated unless he 
exercises his opportunity interest, the question becomes how that 
interest is activated. The Eason court set no standards or 
guidelines on this issue, and prior Georgia cases are inconsistent. 
Several times a putative father has been denied certain rights 
due either to not legitimating the child,155 not marrying the 
152.Id. 
153. The fitness standard applied in determinations between parents is found in 
Carvalho v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 44, 274 S.E.2d 471 (1981): 
A finding of unfitness must center on the parent alone, that is, can the 
parent provide for the child sufficiently so that the government is not forced 
to step in and separate the child from the parent. A court is not allowed to 
terminate a parent's natural right because it has determined that the child 
might have better financial, educational, or even moral advantages elsewhere. 
Only under compelling circumstances found to exist by clear and convincing 
proof maya court sever the parent-child custodial relationship. 
154. Eason, 257 Ga. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 463. 
155. See generally Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 233, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1974) ("For 
eleven years the natural father took no steps to legitimate the child .... "); Blakemore 
v. Blakemore, 217 Ga. 174, 175, 121 S.E.2d 643, 643 (1961) (If a mother is fit and her child 
is not legitimated by the father, a court has no choice but to award custody to the 
mother.); Clark v. Buttry, 121 Ga. App. 492, 495, 174 S.E.2d 356, 359 (1970) (If a mother 
consents to adoption and her child is not legitimated by the father, he does not have 
standing to object to adoption.). 
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mother,l56 or not providing support.157 Unwed fathers' rights also 
have been abridged for reasons such as "unwillingness to sacrifice 
any of the pleasures of single life"l58 and not shouldering significant 
responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, 
and protection of the child.159 Even living with the mother has 
been deemed insufficient if not coupled with notification of the 
grandparents or preparation of the apartment for the baby's 
arrivaJ.160 Unfortunately, what becomes apparent is that no 
particular factors have emerged as guidelines. 
Consequently, an unwed father in Georgia seeking to determine 
whether he has successfully exercised his opportunity interest 
perhaps should refer to the notice section of the Adoption Code 
which sets out the ways in which an unwed father can establish 
a familial bond. Presently, the statute provides that a bond can 
be established by any of the following: living with the child, 
contributing to the child's support, attempting to legitimate the 
child, and providing support for the mother during pregnancy or 
hospitalization for the birth of the child.161 Some combination of 
these factors may be sufficient to place the putative father over 
the threshold and into a constitutionally protected relationship. 
The problem is knowing which factor or combination of factors 
will be successful.162 Until guidelines are established, either 
statutorily or through future adjudication of this issue, 
156. Best v. Acker, 133 Ga. App. 250, 251, 211 S.E.2d 188, 189 (1974) ("The father had 
not even sought to marry the child's mother."). 
157. See generally Mabry v. Tadlock, 157 Ga. App. 257, 259, 277 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1981) 
("It is apparent that no attempt at marriage or support was made until after the [mother) 
married another man."); Williams v. Davenport, 159 Ga. App. 531, 532, 284 S.E.2d 45, 46 
119811 (The putative father's failure to support his child should be considered in deter-
mining the child's best interests.); I'll re Ashmore, 163 Ga. App. 194, 197, 293 S.E.2d 457, 
460 (1982) (The father never provided support for his child and lacked resources to raise 
t he child.). 
158. I'll re J.B.K., 169 Ga. App. 450, 451, 313 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1984) (The mother 
attempted to establish a paternal relationship between father and child but was rebuffed.). 
159. Berry v. Samuels, 145 Ga. App. 687, 244 S.E.2d 593 (1978). 
160. Wojciechowski v. Allen, 238 Ga. 556, 558, 234 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1977). These acts 
were considered proof "that the father had never intended to recognize [the child) as a 
family member." !d. 
161. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(bXl), (2) (1982). 
162. Even the notice statute factors may be of limited usefulness in assessing whether 
the opportunity interest has been activated. Certain circumstances, such as when the 
child is a newborn or when the father's overtures have been rebuffed by the mother, 
may call for more specialized standards. Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the 
Pmblam: and Suggestions For Solutions, 50 TENN. L. REV. 71, 89 (1982) (discussion of 
Justice Stevens' dissent in Caban regarding an unwed father's rights to his newborn). 
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determinations will apparently be made on a case-by-case basis. 
2. Timeliness in Pursuing the Interest 
Another matter for concern is the father's timeliness in pursuing 
his interest. The court in Eason clearly stated that the interest 
can be abandoned if not timely pursued, but again, gave no 
indication of what would be considered timely. One commentator 
suggests that in balancing all the interests involved 
[t]he proper allocation of [the risk of ultimate loss of rights 
in the child], though impossible to define rigidly, must initially 
favor the putative father, and shift toward the adoptive 
parents over time. As the biological tie loses significance, the 
rights of the adoptive parents - based on the fulfillment of 
parental duties-quickly increase. At the same time, the 
interests of the state in protecting unwed mothers, in afford-
ing permanent homes for illegitimate children, and in provid-
ing efficient adoption procedures all favor an early date for 
terminating the putative father's rights. After a time, even 
the putative father's diligence and good faith become irrele-
vant.163 
If the courts choose to follow an analysis similar to that stated 
above, the putative father will be forced to move quickly to 
transform his potential biologically based relationship into one 
which will be legally enforced. "A child's need for permanence 
and stability, like his or her other needs, cannot be postponed. 
It must be provided early .... The basis for constitutional 
protection is missing if the parent seeking it does not take on 
the parental responsibilities timely."164 However, once the mother 
consents to adoption, the putative father must receive notice and 
should have at least a modicum of time to come forward before 
the state may take action to alter his relationship with his child.ISS 
163. Note, Due Process Rights, supra note 4, at 1103. 
164. Buchanan, supra note 125, at 364. The author suggests that timeliness should only 
be an issue when another party, such as a stepfather, has stepped in and provided the 
necessary stability for the child. 
165. Buchanan, supra note 125, at 367. In Georgia, the father has thirty days after 
receiving notice of the adoption to take action. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7(c) (1982). An additional 
problem related to timeliness is that a putative father may seldom be on notice that he 
must take some action to exercise his opportunity interest before it becomes too late. 
However, as the Court found in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 261 (1983), ignorance of the 
law is insufficient reason to criticize it. 
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3. Balancing of the Interests 
An additional problem arising from Eason is that of balancing 
the interests of each party to an adoption. An unwed father's 
rights now may be given more weight, but how they relate to 
those of the mother is unclear. The mother may have been 
motivated to give up her child in an effort to provide a stable 
home for the child but not to enable the father to assume custody. 
Also to be considered are the adoptive parents, who now have 
no idea how long they must wait in fear that the putative father 
may assert his rights and take the baby from them. The interests 
of the child are an additional concern; the child is almost certainly 
better off in one home permanently rather than being shuffled 
from place to place until all adjudication is final. 
These unanswered questions are all issues the Georgia courts 
will need to address. The Eason court realized the need to 
reconsider these issues by remanding the case to determine how 
its holding would affect the particular parties and whether the 
father in Eason had properly exercised his opportunity interest.166 
CONCLUSION 
In Eason. the Georgia Supreme Court took a definite stance 
in recognizing the father's rights and interests in his illegitimate 
child. The remand of this case for a determination of whether or 
not this father exercised his opportunity interest suggests there 
166. Eason, 257 Ga. at 297, 358 S.E.2d at 464. Upon remand, there was a new trial in 
the Superior Court of Cobb County. The seven-day nonjury trial culminated in the 
February 3, 1988 decision by Judge George Kreiger holding that the baby would remain 
with her adoptive parents. The judge found that not only did the unwed father not 
effectively exercise his opportunity interest but also that he was psychologically unfit as 
a parent. 
Timeliness was apparently a vital issue as the judge stated that the father's "alleged 
intentions pale when compared to his failure to act and by his failure to act he lost his 
interest during a critical period commencing at conception." Walston, Lawyers Disagree 
on Precedent in Baby Eason Ruling, Atlanta J_, Feb. 4, 1988, at 2C, col. 5. This ruling 
leaves open the interesting question of whether a putative father must now take affir-
mative action prior to the child's birth in order to have protected rights. If so, a father 
who is not told of the pregnancy will never be able to exercise his opportunity interest. 
But see Doe v_ Chambers, 188 Ga. App. 879, 374 S.E.2d 758 (1988) (father who did not 
learn of child's birth until two months later did not lose his opportunity interest). 
By a 6-1 vote, the Georgia Supreme Court denied the father's application for appeal 
in March of 1988. Walston, High CQUrt Won't Hear Custody Appeal by Baby Eason's Dad, 
Atlanta J., Mar. 31, 1988, at 4B, col. 4_ At this point, the custody battle over baby girl 
Eason is effectively ended unless the father pursues his final option of appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
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will be a case-by-case evaluation of the conduct of a putative 
father both before and after his child's birth. The Georgia Supreme 
Court should direct its attention toward either adopting the 
legislative standards found in the putative father notice statute167 
or establishing its own set of guidelines conclusively listing 
specific ways in which a putative father may effectively exercise 
his opportunity interest. 
There is also a need to create a time frame in which an unwed 
father must demonstrate his desire to move from a potential, 
biologically based relationship with his child to a developed, 
constitutionally protected one.168 This time limitation may be 
based on the type of action the court is asked to take in the 
particular case before it, although recognition of the child's need 
for immediate stability should always be emphasized. 
Finally, the bench, bar, and legislature need to consider carefully 
the competing interests of child, father, mother, adoptive parents, 
and state. The courts should then determine these issues in light 
of the new standard applied to unwed fathers, which shifts the 
evaluation from the best interests of the child to the parental 
fitness of the putative father. A balancing test that weighs these 
interests should be articulated in order to secure the putative 
father's constitutional rights. 
The implications of Eason for adoption cases could be significant. 
Although the Eason standard is a major recognition of an unwed 
father's parental rights, it can also be a double-edged sword. 
Eason cuts through years of discrimination against fathers of 
illegitimate children by enabling them to have a constitutionally 
protected relationship with their children. On the other hand, 
however, it can sever the ties that have bound a child to the 
adoptive parents who may have been that child's primary 
caretakers since birth. Even if that extreme is not realized, the 
Eason decision may conceivably allow a putative father with no 
desire to obtain custody of his child to block the adoption by 
other people; if the father is recognized as a fit parent, he has 
the right to veto as well as to consent to his child's adoption.169 
167. O.C.G.A. S 19-8-7 (1982). 
168. It is possible that the thirty days which the father is given to file legitimation 
proceedings after notification of the pending adoption before losing his rights may be 
incorporated as a time limit on his opportunity interest rights also. See supra text 
accompanying notes 84-91. 
169. This possibility was of concern to the original Quilloin court: 
If the consent of the natural father were also required he might refuse 
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Perhaps the most logical method to avoid any future difficulties 
would be for the legislature to recognize and address these 
uncertainties by revising the unwed father notice statute. This 
statute should include the opportunity interest test with guidelines 
and time limits that would provide clear rules for interested 
parties. 
Ultimately, Eason could be a case of considerable precedential 
value. A putative father who wants to be involved in his child's 
life can no longer be relegated to the status of parent-in-name-
only. He has the opportunity to become a recognized parent with 
a constitutionally protected right to have an influence on how 
and with whom his child is raised. It is up to the father to 
activate this potential relationship. The court in Eason opened 
the door for a fit biological father to have an interest in the 
disposition of his child fully comparable to that of the child's 
mother. 
This new concept will affect adoption proceedings, hearings for 
legitimation petitions, and custody determinations throughout the 
state of Georgia. The courts now should seek to serve the 
interests of all parties, including those of the unwed father, and 
not just the best interests of the child. 
Amy S. Haney 
without accepting the responsibility of fatherhood, and the state could be 
required to sever his relationship before the adoption could proceed. In 
addition, since the father has already shown his lack of interest by his failure 
to legitimate the child, there would be a very real danger of profit seeking 
by the father in order to secure his consent to the adoption. 
Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 233, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248 (1977). But see Eason, 257 Ga. 
at 296, 358 S.E.2d at 463: "On the other hand a fit biological father who pursues his 
interest in order to obtain full custody of his child must be allowed to prevail over 
strangers to the child who seek to adopt." 
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